Desperate to make you a little story, Carlos Salinas de Gortari is campaigning for "Here 'toy." (Do not forget me now that we will regain the presidency. The PRI needs intellectual weight). He has published two books of a kilo, as if the weight give weight to arguments, and now ("Against the official story," Reforma, April 25, 2011) uses an article of mine ("From finance to Los Pinos", Reforma, February 27, 2011). Seeks to refute a report by Dante Delgado Rannauro as chairman of the Special Committee to Determine the Causes of Lower Financing for Development and the large amount of public debt and the instrument by specifying responsibilities and propose corrective actions in order to Encourage Growth Internal Market and Promote the Development of the Country (sic) of the Senate (Senate Gazette No. 120, April 16, 2010, pp. 18-48).
What official history? In Mexico: A difficult passage to modernity (p. 379) says that "the end of my government, only deliver around 500 thousand jobs in the bureaucracy, very low level for a country with 90 million inhabitants." Then (above) denies "some [who] have spoken of several million bureaucrats, though without citing sources." I wonder you do not know the source: Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Sixth Report of Government 1994, Statistical Annex, p. 37, table "Employment in public sector economic activity", the first line (1980) gives a total of 3.15 million, which rises to 4.07 million in 1992 (bottom row). What, then, the "hard data" that requires me not to "repeat the stereotypes of the official story? What is the true official story? Half a million or four million bureaucrats?
Although I explained this at the time ("Why will not jobs," Reforma, November 30, 2003), repeated the lie on his second book with the same straight face that said: neither see nor hear them. " In both book and article insists on washing your hands for the economic disaster left. According to him, everything was the fault of President Zedillo (without acknowledging, at least, that was wrong to appoint him.) And uses the label of the phrase "December mistake" he invented to burn. But the currency crisis that started with six years of Zedillo was the outbreak of errors accumulated during the administration of Salinas. Without doubt, the Treasury Secretary ephemeral Zedillo ineptly handled the rocket that had left. It could have been juggling the outbreak was delayed a few weeks, maybe a few months. But the disappointment and distrust of fairy tales Salinas was going to explode anyway.
The danger was pointed out since the beginning of the Salinas administration by Anne Krueger (The Mexican program of trade and exchange rate Reforms, 1989), which became the number two in the IMF, and in a later paper (Nominal Anchor Exchange Rate Policies as a domestic distortion, 1997) says that the most notable of the 1994 crisis was that it had exploded before (p. 29).
the end of six years, the error of Salinas was already in the textbooks as an example of what not to do. In Macroeconomics, sixth edition (pp. 608-609), Rudi Dornbusch and Stanley Fischer explained to students how they produced the 1982 Mexican crisis and how in 1992 "many observers were aware of how destructive it would repeat the cycle. " But in Mexico it was argued that the deficit reflected a heavy investment that would generate the revenue needed to repay loans. "Under this scheme, in a few years the current account deficit would be reduced, and meanwhile was financed without risk. A nice explanation for how long? ". In the ninth edition (p. 506) added: Intentionally, we have made this without changes, was to emphasize the phrase "A good story, But for how long?". According to our notes, was posted on October 14, 1992. The 1994 crisis "was predictable and was predicted" (was Both Predictable and predicted).
Sebastian Edwards and Moises Naim compiled a book on the crisis (Mexico 1994: Anatomy of an Emerging-market crash). Of special interest are the views of Rudi Dornbusch (who was a consultant in the Salinas team), Robert L. Bartley (editor of The Wall Street Journal and a friend of Salinas) and Francisco Gil-Diaz (Secretary of Salinas).
To Dornbusch (pp. 125-140), "The responsibility is totally (squarely) of former president Carlos Salinas and his obsessive preoccupation with inflation." "The depreciation remained well below inflation, which helped curb inflation, but it meant a position increasingly competitive business. " "In 1993, a devaluation was possible, and certainly the president Salinas considered that option in the spring of that year (or at least said so in private)." But he trusted, and now came the 1994 elections. "The reserves fell to unmanageable levels, the debts are dollarized, shortened maturities. Had to keep playing music that no one realized the emperor has no clothes. Naturally, all the measures that sought to prolong a year dying strategy help to understand the severity of the crisis that followed "(p. 131).
For Bartley (pp. 141-163): "The issuance of tesobonos was a disastrous mistake." Cetes paid less than the dollar but were guaranteed [to inspire confidence]. "A lot of debt in cetes [dollars] was displaced by the tesobonos [dollarization]. Tesobonos debt rose from 3.1 billion dollars in late March to 29.2 before the devaluation of December. " "President Zedillo must be stressed," I got a bad hand of cards (was an exceedingly bad Dealt hand). " For
Francisco Gil-Diaz and Carstens (pp. 165-200) that in the six years of Zedillo were senior officials of the Bank of Mexico: "The bank was privatized in the races, and in many cases without due respect to the appropriate selection criteria (Fit and Proper) of the new shareholders and top executives. " "It eliminated the legal banking [that left all the credit in the hands of the new bankers without experience, without control of central banks and with an extraordinary amount of money to lend wrong]." "The ability to monitor the banks were weak, and was overwhelmed by the growing portfolio of banks. " "Mexico had no effective credit bureaus." "There was a phenomenal expansion of credit given by the development bank." "Foreigners were allowed to buy short-term domestic instruments [entry without control of footloose capital, that the slightest concern is leaving]. "Tesobonos were issued short-term dollar-indexed pesos since late 1991."
The commission report cited Salinas Zedillo is not centered, but in the banking disaster. Salinas prefer not to mention The Senators charge that he privatized the banking discretion, without having made a public auction (p. 42) and note that in November 1994 before Zedillo took office, the balance of tesobonos had risen to 16.110 billion (p. 45), five times the amount in March.
Administration of the truth during the administration of Salinas attained a rare perfection. For his administration announced the recovery of the legendary "stabilizing development": a nearly 6% growth and low inflation at the international level (National Development Plan 1989-1994, p. 56). Multiplied optimistic and reassuring statements. Renegotiation of foreign debt in 1989 was a good thing, but presented on television as a feat worthy of patriotic fervor: Mexico resurgent singing the national anthem while waving the tricolor flag. At a cost of many millions of new textbooks was the official story that teaches children, in which Mexico, through the centuries, had reached its climax in the glorious era Salinas.
Salinas Compact Group discussed privately, but once adopted a line formed one seamless and sought to impose its decision as the truth: no more line than ours. Victor L. I was Urquidi told, repeatedly, privately warned the governor of the Bank of Mexico which was dangerous monetary policy was being followed, but was completely ignored. What I was told that when expressing the same as guest speaker for Econometric Research Center of Mexico, a Bank official upbraided him with a lack of respect that shocked everyone. Of course, if some entrepreneur dared to say that the peso was overvalued, he would be hot flashes. If the newsletter of a brokerage firm expressed doubt, the owners received a call. And if someone remembered that there was still poverty, was disqualified: "Poverty is a great myth." All the problems had been resolved. Mexico was already a First World country.
Lies presented with such confidence and an air of professional who many believed them. For example, the lie that the external debt had declined in proportion to GDP. To understand the ropes of this admirable event How to lie with statistics, we must remember that the external debt is denominated in dollars and GDP in pesos. To split the debt between the GDP, convert the debt to GDP in pesos or dollars. But with what kind of change? If the peso overvalued, it appears that the GDP "grows" (In dollars), although actual production has not grown, and it seems that the debt is reduced in proportion to GDP. Therefore, the proportion fell beautifully, but in fact, total external debt was growing faster than GDP. In the six years, GDP grew 18% and 38% of total external debt. The story was a fairy tale.
PRI The years that were a feast of lively accounts to conceal the collapse. It is understood that the PRI today (willing to be seen as a new option) does not want to carry that political cost, and pretend that Salinas is in Ireland, making deep studies in the Gazette of the Senate. Neither sees nor hears.
Gabriel Zaid
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Carlos Salinas is a jerk. He begins to criticize and try to clear his name and his administration but without providing data, PRI-style with nothing but demagoguery. Gabriel Zaid In this paper puts in place and with hard data. The Salinas administration hatched the crisis of December 1994 and during that time kept a tight control of media and information. Salinas and ruled from 1989 to 2004 and Peña Nieto has ruled the State of Mexico, debt, lies and a lot of media coverage. Explain your vote.